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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1954-1955*
VII. PUBLIC LAW
C0oNFLICT OF LAWS

In the field of Conflict of Laws, a rather curious decision was
handed down by the Appellate Court for the First District in the
case of Simpson v. Simpson.' Its impact is difficult to assess
since the point for which it might be deemed important seems
not to have been actually considered by the court, although a
holding thereon is implicit from the result achieved. In the
subject case, the plaintiff had obtained a divorce in Tennessee
supplemented by an appropriate decree for the support of a minor
child whose custody she had been awarded. The defendant, sometime thereafter, became a resident of Illinois and subsequently
a decree was entered in Illinois adopting the Tennessee decree
of divorce and order for child support, and, inter alia, setting
forth verbatim the applicable Tennessee laws relating to interest.2
Pursuant to the Illinois decree, a judgment was entered for support money in arrears dating back prior to the time the Illinois
decree was entered, but the court refused to allow interest on
each installment from and after the time it became due. The
Appellate Court, however, held that the plaintiff should receive
interest on successively maturing installments, and moreover, in
the amount of six per cent per annum, the rate provided by the
* Parts I to VI of this survey appeared in the issue for December, 1955, Vol. 33,
No. 1. Limitations of space prevented the full publication thereof in that number.
14 ll. App. (2d) 526, 124 N. E. (2d) 573 (1955).
Leave to appeal has been
allowed.
2 Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 5, Tit. II, §§ 7301-2 and 7307-8.
99
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Tennessee Code.3 This result seems to be consistent with the
general rules respecting damages, which state that the law of
damages is deemed to be substantive and, normally, the law
of the place where the cause arose would be applicable. However,
this appears to be the first time that the precise point has been
decided in Illinois, nor does a cursory inspection reveal any decisions thereon in other American jurisdictions.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

The field of constitutional law, although active during the
survey period, has not produced any startling innovations, but
some of the decisions are noteworthy for the manner in which
they apply or define recognized principles. The first of these is4
American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. The City of Chicago,
which is treated herein in its entirety, since there are no other
cases of importance involving questions of administrative law.
In the subject case, the plaintiff questioned the validity of a
municipal ordinance5 which, in essence, permitted the censorship
of motion picture films on the ground that they were immoral or
obscene. The three principal objections raised by the plaintiff
were that censorship is a prior restraint on free speech and always
unconstitutional; that the standards, "immoral and obscene", are
so vague as to violate due process of law; and that the scope
of judicial review is inadequate. In answer to the first objection,
the court took the position that the State had a legitimate interest
to protect and concluded that some censorship was possible. As
to the second objection, it was held that the word "obscene"immoral was treated as a synonym-had acquired a relatively
precise legal meaning, at least sufficient to meet the requirements
of due process. The test laid down for obscenity was the effect
of the work as a whole upon the normal average person; that
is, whether its calculated purpose and dominant effect was to
3 Ibid., § 7302.
43 Ill. (2d) 334. 121 N. E. (2d) 585 (1954), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 504, 1954 Ill.
L. Forum 678, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1180, and 8 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 638. An appeal to
the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a final judgment:
348 U. S. 979, 75 S. Ct. 572, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 470 (1955).
5 Mun. Code Chicago 1939, Ch. 155, §§ 1 and 3.
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arouse sexual desires to the extent of outweighing whatever artistic or other merit it may possess. It is to be noted that any
test with respect to particular portions or the effect on particular
persons was repudiated. On the third issue, the Supreme Court
agreed with the plaintiff and remanded the case for further proceedings. On such further proceedings, it was ordered that the
plaintiff not carry the burden of proving that the censor's action
was arbitrary and unreasonable, but that therein it must affirmatively be made to appear that the film is within the proscription
of the ordinance.
The principle" that the state has an interest in the welfare
of children which, at times, may exceed that of the parents has
received further impetus in the case of People ex rel. Nabstedt
v. Barger.7 Therein, an attack was made on Section 15 of the
Family Court Act as amended,8 which authorizes the appointment
of a guardian for the purpose of consenting to the adoption of
children where one or both parents are mentally ill. The court,
although recognizing that the parent(s) had a remote interest
in the event that they should recover, felt that the state's interest
was paramount, and that such interest as the parent(s) might
have was adequately protected by the conditions imposed, specifically, that the mental illness must have existed for the three
years immediately preceding the appointment of the guardian
and that two qualified physicians testify that the parent(s) would
not recover in the foreseeable future.
A novel, though unsuccessful, attack was made on the Retailer's Occupation Tax Act" in the case of Diana Shoe Stores
Company v. Department of Revenue.10 The plaintiff proceeded
on the theory that no taxing or revenue statute may extend beyond
the biennium of the General Assembly which enacted it, and
6 For example, see People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952),
and Larson, "Child Neglect in the Exercise of Religious Freedom," 32 CmoAGOKENT LAW REvIEw 283 (1954).
T3

Il1.

(2d) 511, 121 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954), noted in 33 CICAGo-KENT LAW Rx-

vIEw 249. See also Section V, Family Law, note 10.
8 Ili. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 209. See also ibid., Ch. 4, § 3-41.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, §440 et seq.
105 Ill. (2d) 112, 125 N. E. (2d) 71 (1955).
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relied on constitutional stipulations providing that all appropriations shall terminate at the expiration of the first fiscal quarter
after the adjournment of the next regular session,"" and that the
General Assembly may tax occupations as it shall, from time to
time, direct.12 The plaintiff urged, and the court rejected, an
inference that the two provisions were correlatives, and therefore, revenue measures were limited in the same manner as
appropriations.
Regulations pertaining to loyalty were involved in two cases
decided during the past year. In the case of In re Anastaplo,1
an applicant for admission to the bar, after having passed the
written examination, refused to answer questions concerning his
communist affiliations, and the Committee on Character and Fitness refused to certify him for admission. After determining
that the Committee neither exceeded its authority nor abused
its discretion, the Supreme Court was faced with the contention
that such inquiries violated the right of free speech under the
first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. This contention was repelled on the grounds that the
government's interest in the character of members of the bar
was sufficient to justify any invasion which might have occurred,
and also that the practice of law was a privilege upon which
reasonable conditions might be imposed. In the other such case,
that of Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 the Supreme
Court held invalid that part of the Housing Authority Act which
requires tenants in public housing to execute a loyalty oath'15
for the reason that it fails to distinguish between knowing and
innocent affiliation with communist groups. As such, the court
felt it to be a purely arbitrary requirement, offensive to due
process of law. The case is made more interesting by the fact
11 II. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 18.
12 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 2.
13 3 Ill. (2d) 471, 121 N. E. (2d) 826 (1954), noted in 50 Northwestern L. Rev.
94, 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. 83. Appeal and certiorari denied: 348 U. S. 946, 75 S. Ct.
439, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 306 (1955); rehearing denied: 349 U. S. 908, 75 S. Ct. 579,
99 It. Ed. (adv.) 475 (1955).
144111. (2d) 319, 122 N. E. (2d) 522 (1954).
15 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 67J, § 25.01.
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that the lease under which the tenants held possession had a
fifteen day cancellation provision. It was nevertheless held that
there could be no discrimination on this basis irrespective of
whether or not any abstract right to occupy public housing
existed.1 6
A successful attack was made on Section 10.2 of the Mutual
Building, Loan, and Homestead Act," in the case of Gorhai v.
Hodge, 8 on the theory that it violated an almost forgotten provision of the State Constitution.1 9 This provision requires that
acts of the General Assembly authorizing or creating corporations or associations with banking powers be submitted to a vote
of the people at the next general election, which step was not
taken. The court held that the investment certificates authorized
by Section 10.2 were essentially deposits rather than loans and,
therefore, a referendum was required.
Three cases dealt with statutes under which municipal authorities are attempting to alleviate conditions which have become
acute in the past few years. An unsuccessful challenge was made
on the law authorizing the construction of municipal parking
facilities" in City of Chicago v. Central National Bank of Chicago. 1 It was there urged that a provision requiring the approval of a planning commission before the city could act
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The contention was rejected since the approval of the commission was merely a contingent event making the law operative,
a well-recognized method of exercising legislative power. The
other two are simply a rehash of objections raised and holdings
achieved in contests relating to other community improvement
programs, and are mentioned only for their effect on the specific
18 This result Is in accord with that previously reached by the United States
Supreme Court: Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216
(1952).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 222.2.
186 Ill. (2d) 31, 126 N. E. (2d) 626 (1965).
19 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 5.
20 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 52.1-1.
215 Ill. (2d) 164, 125 N. E. (2d) 94 (1955).
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2
statute involved. In People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicagoy
the validity of the Urban Community Conservation Act 2 was
upheld, the court concluding that the prevention of slums is
a public purpose and is accomplished when redevelopment is
achieved. Hence, the subsequent use of the property is immaterial. The validity of the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Law 24 was challenged in Zisook v. Maryland-Drexel
Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporatio25 for a whole host of
reasons, none of which the court thought valid.

In one other case, that of Figura, et al. v. Cummins,2' constitutional objections to a statute were sustained. Therein, that
portion of the Industrial Home Work Act 2 7 which prohibits the
processing of metal springs in the home was held invalid for violating the prohibition against special legislation.28 Several other
attacks made on Illinois statutes during the period of the survey
were uniformly unsuccessful. In the case of People v. Lewis,29
the Supreme Court upheld Section 216 of the Revenue Act of
1939,0 which alters the method of computing the interest or
premium due, in addition to the principal amount, when redeeming from a tax foreclosure sale in equity. The Supreme Court
proved to be too formidable to be impressed by arguments challenging the Chicago Regional Port District Act"' and the Lake
Calumet Harbor Act 2 in the case of People ex rel. Gutknecht v.
Chicago Regional Port District" and both acts were sustained.
An attack on Section 4 of the Illinois Optometric Act as amended 4
223 Ill. (2d) 539, 121 N. E. (2d) 791 (1954), noted In 43 Il.
Ill.. L. Forum 684.
23 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 67J, § 91.8 et seq.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 550.1 et seq.
253 Ill. (2d) 570, 121 N. E. (2d) 804 (1954).
264 Ill. (2d) 44, 122 N. E. (2d) 162 (1954).
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 252(G).
28 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
295 Ill. (2d) 117, 125 N. E. (2d) 87 (1955).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 697.
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 19, § 152 et seq.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 19, § 113 et seq.
334 Ill. (2d) 363, 123 N. E. (2d) 92 (1954).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953. Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 105.4.
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met with a similar fate in the case of Roberts Optical Company
v. Department of Registration and Education.5
Two other cases within the subject field appear to merit
brief consideration. In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,as
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court 37 which reached the conclusion that a
state cannot suspend the right of an interstate carrier to operate
under a federally granted license, even though such carrier
habitually violates its motor vehicle laws with respect to total
Although discussed elsewhere
weight and load distribution.'
in this survey, it is herein noted that Section 35 of the Business
Corporation Act 9 was declared unconstitutional in the case of
Wolfson v. Avery.40
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Although many cases in the course of a year raise questions
of law concerning municipal corporations, few, if any, have any
lasting effect on this field. One of these rare cases is Baltis v.
Village of Westchester,41 wherein the Supreme Court was faced
with the question of whether or not a municipality is bound by
its own zoning ordinances. The municipality had proposed to
erect a standpipe in an area zoned for single family residences,
and the court concluded that they might not do so in violation
of their own zoning ordinance, at least when acting in a proprietary capacity. It is significant to note that the court expressly
disclaimed any intention of deciding whether they might do so
when acting in a governmental capacity. As a consequence of
this decision, it appears that a municipality must now take the
354 I1. (2d) 290, 122 N. E. (2d) 824 (1954).
36348 U. S. 61, 75 S. Ct. 191, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 101 (1954), noted in 33 N. Car.
L. Rev. 621, 16 Ohio St. L. J. 270, and 30 Notre Dame Lawyer 477.
372 Il. (2d) 58, 117 N. E. (2d) 106 (1954), noted in 39 Minn. L. Rev. 223, and
40 Va. L. Rev. 793.
38 The statute specifically involved is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 229b.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.35.
406 Ii. (2d) 78, 126 N. E. (2d) 701 (1955). For a more detailed discussion, see
Section I, Business Organizations, note 1.
413 Ii. (2d) 388, 121 N. E. (2d) 495 (1955), noted In 43 Ill. B. J. 317.
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same steps, either by way of variation procedure or change in
the zoning laws,' as would be required of an individual.
An interesting situation was presented in the case of City of
Chicago v. Wicky, 48 in which the city had, pursuant to legislative
authority,44 enacted an ordinance making it unlawful to keep or
operate devices commonly known as pinball machines. 4 5 A subsequent state taxing statute46 required that such devices be licensed,
and the argument was made that it repealed, by implication, the
authority under which the city had acted. The court, however,
thought otherwise, thus creating the anomalous situation of the
47
state licensing that which is prohibited by the municipality.
The right of an individual to use property contrary to the
terms of a zoning ordinance was in issue in the case of Village
of Skokie v. Almendinger." Therein, the defendant had been
operating a trailer park on the property in question prior to the
enactment of the restrictive ordinance, though, at that time, he
did not own the property and was, in fact, a trespasser thereon.
Prior to the commencement of the present action, a suit by the
village to enjoin said use, the defendant acquired title to the
property. On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District
held that the prior owner had, by reason of the defendant's use
and occupancy, acquired the right to a non-conforming use even
though apparently unaware of its existence. It followed then
that the defendant acquired the same right by his purchase.
A further encroachment upon the immunity of a municipal
corporation from tort liability has been achieved in the case of
Tracy v. Davis.4 9 It has heretofore been decided that a school
42 See, for example, Decatur Park District v. Becker, 368 i1. 442, 14 N. E. (2d)
490 (1938).
43 4 Ill. (2d) 423, 123 N. E. (2d) 335 (1954).
44 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23--56.
45 Mun. Code Chicago 1939, Ch. 193, §26.
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 481b.1 et seq.
47 An analogous situation is presented by the state and federal governments,
with the latter licensing that which is prohibited by the former. For example, see
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 73 S. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. 754 (1953).
48 5 In. App. (2d) 522, 126 N. E. (24d) 421 (1955).

49123 P. Supp. 160 (1954), noted in 33 CH IOAGO-KENT LAw RIETMw 175.
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district might be held liable in tort if there were non-public
funds available and public funds would not thereby be impaired.50
In the instant case, the court concluded that it was not necessary
to allege in a complaint that there were non-public funds available to satisfy a judgment which might be rendered. Hence, the
complaint was held to be sufficient for the purpose of determining the question of liability of the school district. However, in
recognition of the character of public funds and the immunity
which they enjoy, the court further stated that any judgment so
taken could be satisfied only from non-public funds.
1 contains
One other case, that of Schien v. City of Virden,"
a ruling which might be considered new, although its impact is
rather narrow. The traditional rule with respect to property
dedicated to a city for public purposes is that it is trust property
and may not be leased or conveyed by the city.5 2 However, in
the subject case, the Supreme Court upheld a lease of such
property to another municipal corporation, a fire protection district embracing the entire city. The result was predicated upon
the fact that the lessee would continue to devote the property
to public purposes and the city retained sufficient control to
enable it to perform its trust.

TAXATION

The most significant development in Illinois taxation dur53
ing the year has been the adoption of the Illinois Use Tax Act,
with a companion provision for a half cent additional Retailers'
Occupation Tax for municipalities on a local option basis.5 4 The

50 Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109
N. B. (2d) 636 (1952).
515 Ill. (2d) 494, 126 N. E. (2d) 201 (1955).
52 See Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 S. Ct.
110, 36 L. Ed. 1018 (1892).
53Laws 1955, p. 2027, S. B. No. 510; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120,
1 439.1 et seq.
54 Laws 1955, p. 437 at p. 440, S. B. No. 694; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24,
1 23--111.
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general structure5 5 of the Illinois Use Tax Act, though rather
curious, constitutes an ingenious and skillful attempt to bring
interstate transactions within the general orbit of the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act5" without running afoul of the constitutional
problems which it was designed to meet. 5 Although in substance
purporting to tax the initial use of all tangible personal property, whether acquired in an interstate or intrastate sale, the Act,
in its present form, would apply only to interstate sales. The
tax is imposed upon the user, rather than upon the retailer as in
the case of the Retailers' Occupation Tax, though the retailer is
made the agent of the state to collect and remit the tax. Nevertheless, the retailer need not remit that portion of the tax which
pertains to a transaction upon which the retailer is obligated to
and does in fact pay the Retailers' Occupation Tax.58
Several cases under the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act5 9
should be noticed in passing. One of these is the case of Ruby
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,"° in which the Supreme
Court held invalid a rule of the Department of Revenue which permitted retailers to exclude from sales, in making a return for Retailers' Occupation Tax purposes, the value of traded-in property
until such property is sold. The Court characterized the rule as
an attempted assumption of legislative power without any basis
in the statute, and as such, invalid. Thereafter, the General Assembly promptly amended the Act so as to exclude from the op55 The Use Tax Act follows as closely as possible the Illinois Cigarette Use Tax
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.31 et seq., the validity of which
has been sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court: Johnson v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257,
108 N. E. (2d) 429 (1952).
Certiorari denied: 345 U. S. 923, 73 S. Ct. 781,
97 L. Ed. 1355 (1953).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, VoL 2, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
57 First and foremost is the authority to levy such a tax.
For example, the
only basis for the tax Is that the use of the property In question is a "privilege"
within the purview of Section 1 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
Although in connection with the Cigarette Use Tax Act, the use of cigarettes was
held to be a "privilege", it remains to be determined whether that appellation
will be applied to the eating of food or the wearing of clothing.
58 The provisions with reference to retention of the tax by the retailer also
create problems. Section 7 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution requires that
all taxes "levied for State purposes shall be paid into the State Treasury", and
Section 6 of that Article forbids "commutation" of taxes.
59 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
6 Ill. (2d) 147, 126 N. E. (2d) 617 (1955).
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eration of the tax any amount allowed as a credit for tangible
personal property taken in trade." It should be noted that said
amendment probably does not apply to the newly adopted Use
Tax Act, of which mention has heretofore been made.
Two interesting decisions have been handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court dealing with the applicability of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act to certain transactions in interstate com62
merce. In Superior Coal Company v. Department of Revenue,
the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the tax on the sale
of coal in Illinois at the mine to an interstate carrier, some of
such coal being intended for consumption within the state, and
some of it being consigned to users outside the state. Although
the court seemingly based its decision in large measure upon the
rather indefinite and inconclusive character of the arrangement
by which certain shipments were consigned without the state,6 3
it employed as an alternative basis for its decision the now familiar but not too clearly defined doctrine that the mere fact
that a tax falls upon interstate commerce does not necessarily
invalidate the tax as an interference with such commerce."
In contrast with this more liberal approach toward the taxation of interstate commerce is the majority opinion, two justices
dissenting, in Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Hoffman.65 There
the court held exempt from taxation sales of gas by an interstate
pipeline company directly to large industrial users. Although the
two dissenting justices apparently agreed that the sales were
made in interstate commerce, they took the position that the imposition of the tax would not "unduly burden interstate commerce", but merely require such commerce to bear its fair share
of the tax burden. On the other hand, the majority seemed unwill61 Laws 1955, p. 2037, S. B. No. 796; Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 440.
The pertinent material is contained in the second of three sections numbered 440.
624 Inl. (2d) 459, 123 N. E. (2d) 713 (1954).
63 It was thereby able to distinguish earlier cases, particularly Nudelman v.
Globe Varnish Co., 114 F. (2d) 916 (1940).
"See, for example, McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33,
60 S. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 (1940).
654 Ill. (2d) 468, 123 N. E. (2d) 503 (1955), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 671. Schaefer,
J. filed a dissenting opinion in which Hershey, J. concurred.
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ing to attempt a precise definition of such phraseology, and made
the observation that "The present case involves the sum of
$1,000,000, which in our view represents a substantial burden upon
the payor regardless of size or resources."'
Questions involving notice and hearing with respect to Illinois property taxation made news in two cases. In Dietman v.
Hunter,17 the county supervisor of assessments had increased the
assessed valuation, as return by the township assessor, on a
number of tracts of real estate without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the owners of the properties affected.
One of the owners filed a representative suit to enjoin the extension and collection of the tax contending that he had been deprived of property without due process of law by reason of the
failure to give notice prior to the increases. The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this contention upon the ground that due
process entitles a taxpayer only to be heard, and to be heard
once, prior to the time that the assessment becomes final, and
that such opportunity was available before the Board of Review. Certainly the reiteration of so oft enunciated a doctrine"
would not seem worthy of comment, except for doubts and confusion which have been created by earlier Illinois decisions, particularly the two decisions in the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge
Co. cases. 9 The doctrine apparently laid down in those cases
was that although the taxpayer was not entitled to notice or opportunity to be heard before the assessor performed his function,
nevertheless where such assessment had been made, the taxpayer
was entitled to notice before the supervisor of assessments could
increase the assessment. In a rather well written opinion, the
court pointed out that in the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Co.
cases, the court had been led into error in applying to the field
4 Ii. (2d) 468, 477, 123 N. E. (2d) 503, 508 (1955).
675 Ill. (2d) 474, 126 N. E. (2d) 228 (1955).
68 See, for example, Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 710, 4 S. Ct.
663, 28 L. Ed. 569 (1884), and Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550, 20
S. Ct. 485, 44 L. Ed. 583 (1900).
69 St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Co. v. Eisele, 263 Ill. 50, 104 N. R. 1013 (1914),
and People ex rel. Eisele v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Co., 268 I1. 477, 109
N. E. 311 (1915).
66
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of real property, where no return is filed or self-assessment made
by the taxpayer, a doctrine laid down at an early date with reference to assessment of personal property; namely, that where
a personal property tax return has been made and accepted by the
assessor, such acceptance constituted an assessment, and the
valuation could not be increased without prior notice to the taxpayer.7 ' The court unequivocally overruled the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Co. cases, but apparently did not therein disturb
the existing rule with respect to the taxation of personal property,
though it rather carefully refrained from including in its opinion
anything which might embarrass the court in later repudiating
this aspect of the doctrine as well.
In the case of People v. Jennings,7 on the other hand, the
majority of the court indicated that it was not going to curtail
by judicial decision the complete notice and hearing provided by
statute, even though not required by constitutional mandate. In
that case there had been a complete failure to publish in a newspaper for the year 1951 the list of personal property assessments,
as required by Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1939.72 The
court concluded that the language thereof was mandatory rather
than directory and held that the assessment was invalid. 73
VIII.

TORTS

The continuing evolution of the law of torts has produced
several important developments during the past year. Of prime
importance is the case of Kahn v. James Burton Company,'
70 Perhaps the principal case enunciating this doctrine is Tolman v. Salomon,
191 Ill. 202, 60 N. E. 809 (1901), a case in which the taxpayer was unsuccessful
because of failure to allege affirmatively that his valuation had been accepted

by the assessor.
713 Ill. (2d)
125,119 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954).
Maxwell, J. and Hershey, J.
dissented.
72 Il.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 584.
73 It was also held that a complete failure to publish was not cured by a later
section of the act which protects the assessment from attack by reason of certain
errors in publication: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, VoL 2, Ch. 120, § 587.
1 5 Ill. (2d) 614, 126 N. E. (2d) 836 (1955), reversing 1 Ill. App. (2d) 370, 117
N. E. (2d) 670 (1954), noted in 32 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW RLviEw 348, and 30 Notre
Dame Lawyer 326. Hershey, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Davis, J., concurred.
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wherein the Supreme Court apparently abandoned the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The defendants therein were a contractor
in control of the premises and his supplier of lumber, who had
negligently piled lumber at the site of a construction project. The
plaintiff, an eleven year old child, was injured while playing
thereon. The court held the lumber dealer liable, though not in
control of the premises, on the ground that it knew or should have
known that children played in the area and was therefore bound
to pile the lumber in a careful manner. The contractor was also
held liable, despite the fact that the plaintiff was a trespasser,
on the ground that a duty of care was created by the knowledge
that children played in the vicinity and might come upon the
premises. The court expressly refused to apply the attractive
nuisance doctrine and all of its ramifications, and dealt with it as
an ordinary problem of negligence with attractiveness being
merely a factor in determining foreseeability.
The extent of a duty of care was also involved in two other
cases. Despite a prior decision to the contrary,' the Appellate
Court for the First District held, in the case of Rotheli v. Chicago
Transit Authority,3 that a public carrier ceases to owe an
extraordinary duty of care to a transferring passenger who has
reached a place of safety. The court seemed to feel that it was
too great a burden to require the carrier to exercise extraordinary
care while the transferring passenger crosses streets and mingles
with other pedestrians. A greater duty than ordinary care was
prominent in the case of Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc.,4 in
which the plaintiff, a guest of the hotel, was attacked by a stranger
upon entering his room. The Appellate Court for the First District held that an innkeeper in these circumstances owes its
guests a "very high degree of care", but upon rehearing this
statement was modified to a "high degree of care". But what2 Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 I1. 25, 124 N. E. 334, 6 A. L. R. 1291
(1919).
3 5 I1. App. (2d) 190, 125 N. E. (2d) 283 (1955). Kiley, J., filed a concurring
opinion reconciling the two cases since, though not stressed in the Feldman case,
the passenger had not reached a place of safety.
4 5 fI. App. (2d) 327, 125 N. E. (2d) 545 (1955).
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ever language is used, it seems that an innkeeper must do everything in its power to prevent an attack by strangers upon a guest
while asleep or upon entering the room.
Questions relating to proximate cause were generated in four
cases. In Walters v. Christy,5 the defendant, while making alterations to a building, boarded up the rear windows and constructed
a solid wooden front. Burglars were thus able to enter the plaintiff's adjoining premises undetected, but the Appellate Court for
the Third District held that there was no duty on the defendant
to protect plaintiff's property. The court further stated that,
even assuming negligence, proximate cause was lacking since it
was not reasonably foreseeable that burglars would intervene as
a consequence of the negligence. On the other hand, a chemical
fog created by the defendant in a mosquito spraying operation
was held to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury in the
case of King v. Mid-State Freight Lines, Inc.6 Therein, the car
in which plaintiff was riding struck the rear of a truck which was
moving slowly because of the fog. The court was of the opinion
that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury since the slowing down of the truck, even if an intervening
independent force, was reasonably foreseeable.
An attempt to stretch the result obtained in Ney v. Yellow
Cab Company7 was unsuccessful in the case of Barton v. Williams,8 wherein the plaintiff argued that a father, who permitted
his car keys to be accessible to his minor daughter, should have
foreseen that she would drive his car without a driver's license
and negligently harm someone. The statute violated, 9 however,
pertained to drivers, rather than owners as in the Ney case, 10
55 Ill. App. (2d) 68, 124 N. E. (2d)

658 (1955).

66 111. App. (2d) 159, 126 N. E. (2d) 868 (1955). Leave to appeal has been denied.
72 111. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74 (1954), noted in 32 C(:OAGo-KENT LAw REvnw
313, 42 Ill. B. J. 580, and 1954 Il. L. Forum 347, affirming 348 Ill. App. 161, 108 N. E.
(2d) 508 (1953).
In this case, the defendant's driver, in violation of a statute,
left the automobile with the motor running, thus enabling a thief to steal the car
and injure the plaintiff in the getaway.
84 Ill. App. (2d) 266, 124 N. E. (2d) 356 (1955). Leave to appeal has been denied.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95J, § 73.12.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 951, § 189.
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and the court easily distinguished the two situations. The Scaffolding Act1 1 furnished the requisite legal duty in the case of
Fetterman v. Production Steel Company of Illinois,12 wherein it
was held that under its provisions an iron worker employed by a
general contractor could recover for injuries sustained when he
fell from a faulty scaffold which had been erected by a subcontractor. The fact that the injured person was not one for whose
use the scaffolding was primarily erected and the fact that it was
not used in a normal manner were held not to absolve the subcontractor from liability inasmuch as customs in the trade made
both of these events foreseeable.
Persons consenting to criminal conduct resulting in their
injury are confronted with another decision denying recovery.
In the case of Castronovo v. Murawsky, 3 the Appellate Court
for the Second District denied recovery for a woman's death
caused by a criminal abortion'1 which was negligently performed.
There being no indication that granting recovery would reduce
criminal abortions, the court relied upon prior authority 5 and
concluded that there is no tortious conduct if the plaintiff consents.1 6
Also worth noting are several miscellaneous cases dealing
with problems of contributory negligence and immunity from tort
liability. In the case of Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Chas.
Ind Co., 17 the Appellate Court for the Second District held that
a telephone company, the owner of underground cables, was not
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 60 et seq.
Leave to appeal has been
124 Ill. App. (2d) 403, 124 N. E. (2d) 637 (1955).
denied.
133 Ill. App. (2d) 168, 120 N. E. (2d) 871 (1954), noted In 33 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
RVIxEW 181.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 3.
15 For example, see Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84, 60 L. R. A. 286
(1902), where the plaintiff, wounded while participating in a charivari party, was
denied recovery because he and the defendant were engaged in an unlawful enterprise.
16 The opinion does not clearly distinguish between: (a) consent to the operation,
which is a defense to an intentional tort, and (b) assumption of the risks of the
operation, which would be a defense to a negligent operation. See Restatement,
Torts, 1948 Supp., § 60, comment b.
17 3 Ill. App. (2d) 258, 121 N. E. (2d) 600 (1955), noted in 33 CHICAGo-KENT
LAW REwIw 281.
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contributorily negligent in failing to inform an excavator of the
cables since the court thought it was the excavator's duty to
inform itself of prior underground installations. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in the
case of Tracy v. Davis,' refused to dismiss a tort action against
a school district merely because the complaint did not allege that
there were non-public funds available to satisfy a judgment. It
concluded that the plaintiff could maintain his action and obtain
a judgment, though satisfaction might be had only from non-public
funds. In Cawley v. Warren,9 plaintiff sued an Illinois state's
attorney, an assistant state's attorney, and the foreman of a
grand jury for indicting her wrongfully and allegedly violating
her civil rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit dismissed the suit since it thought all of the
defendants were judicial officers of the State of Illinois. As
such, they were entitled to the same immunity from civil suits
as judges.
With respect to legislation, the laws relating to wrongful
death were amended to preclude the contributory negligence of
one beneficiary of the action from being a defense to the whole
action. However, the pecuniary injuries of such beneficiary are
not recoverable, and he cannot share in any amount that is
recovered in the action.2"

18 123 F. Supp. 160 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 175. For a
more detailed discussion, see Section VII, Public Law, note 49.
19216 F. (2d) 74 (1954).
20 Laws 195, p. -, H. B. No. 565, and H. B. No. 777; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 70, § 2. This amendment applies to a wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring after June 30, 1955.
A comment in 44 Ill. B. J. 176 expresses doubt that the contributory negligence
amendment is the law because the later amendment, H. B. No. 777, does not repeat
the contributory negligence provision contained in the earlier amendment, H. B. 565.
Examination of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955 casts a doubt upon this doubt. The later amendment as therein reported repeats in identical language the contributory negligence
provision contained in the earlier amendment.

